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Abstract  
In 2003 the Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) was established in 
the EU, which limited the trade of machinery, electrical and electronic equipment 
that have at least one of the substances considered hazardous under RoHS directive. 
Since countries trading with the EU must comply with this new regulation, it is 
expected a decrease in value of imports to the EU. In this paper, it is followed the 
procedures used in Heckman (1979), as well as the extended procedure suggested by 
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) to ascertain the effects on the persistence of 
trade and values of trade. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
As import tariffs and other trade policies are reduced or eliminated, according to 
negotiations within the WTO and the increase in FTAs, the importance of other policies 
are playing a fundamental role in international trade, such as non-tariff barriers to trade. 
In addition, pro-environmental policies unintentionally change the structure of trade and 
hinder international trade. In 2003, the EU established restrictions on the use of 
hazardous substances, this restriction is known as the RoHS directive. This directive 
restricts the sale of machinery, electrical and electronic equipment that contain 
hazardous substances detailed in RoHS, for both foreign and EU countries. Since all 
imports must comply with this regulation, a decrease in the value of imports from 
foreign countries to EU countries is expected. In this study, I attempt to confirm the 
effect of the RoHS directive on trade in the EU. 
In empirical research, the gravity model is widely used to analyze international 
trade flows. Moreover, many researchers consider including zero trade flows to obtain 
unbiased estimates. In this study, I employed a sample selection model and the extended 
procedure suggested by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008, the HMR model), to 
address the effect on “trade persistence” and “trade value”. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the trade flows 
of machinery, electrical and electronic equipment as well as environmental regulation in 
the EU, and it reviews some previous studies of environmental standards. Section 3 
describes the gravity model for international trade and considers the observation of zero 
trade flows. Section 4 describes the estimation procedures of this analysis and dataset. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 6 summarizes the 
empirical results of this study. 
 
 
2. Components of Trade, Policy, and Previous Studies 
 
2.1.  Trade Flows and Environmental Regulation in the EU 
 
Figure 1 plots the imports of machinery, electrical and electronic equipment in the EU. 
The bars represent the aggregate trade value of these goods, while the solid line 
indicates the percent of country pairs and goods that are actually trade. It is easy to 
notice that the value increased from 2004 to 2007, before the global recession in 2008. 
Conversely, a fraction of the existing trade of machinery, electrical and electronic 
 Figure 1. EU imports of machinery, electrical and electronic equipment 
Note: Constructed from data on HS84-HS92 commodities imported into EU27 countries from 199 export 
countries. 
 
 
equipment rose until 2003 and then dropped sharply in 2004. As it is patent from the 
Figure 1, the trade value and the fraction of existing trade do not exhibit the same 
behavior. Policies including environmental regulations have different impacts on these 
two measurements; thus each of them should be analyzed separately. Moreover, a 
fraction of existing trade is lower than 0.3 after 2000. Therefore, in an empirical 
analysis, the zero trade flows that dominate a large fraction of the country pairs and 
goods should be considered. 
In figure 2, it is shown the total trade value of machinery, electrical and 
electronic equipment imports as well as the share of these goods in total import. As it is 
possible to notice, the EU total import value increases as does the values of machinery, 
electrical and electronic equipment, but at a sharper rate. This is reflected in the 
decrease in the share of these goods. 
The decline in the fraction of existing trade after 2004 and the share of 
machinery, electrical and electronic equipment are thought to be aftereffects of 
strengthening the environmental regulations in the EU. In recent years, the EU has 
attached great importance to environmental problems, in particular, waste reduction. 
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 Figure 2. Share of machinery, electrical and electronic equipment in the EU 
Note: Constructed from data on EU27 import countries and 199 export countries 
 
 
As an example, the collection and recycling of container and packaging waste were 
defined and made into law in each country. Similarly, recycling vehicle waste is also 
mandated by the End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) directive. The strictest regulation is the 
RoHS directive, which restricts the sale of goods that contain hazardous substances in 
the EU.1 This directive also requires that waste (the recycling of all disposals such as,) 
from machinery, electrical and electronic equipment must be recycled. This directive is 
also valid for goods imported into the EU; in other words, exports from foreign 
countries to the EU may face environmental regulations as trade barriers. The RoHS 
directive was established on February 13, 2003, and enforcement began on July 1st, 
2006. The deceleration of the increasing trade of machinery, electrical and electronic 
equipment relative to total imports and enforcement of this policy ware observed to 
occur simultaneously. While there are many other causes, it is possible that the RoHS 
directive hindered the import of machinery, electrical and electronic equipment in the 
EU. 
                                                   
1  Specifically, lead, cadmium, mercury, hexavalent chromium, polybrominated biphenyl, and 
polybrominated biphenyl ether are subjects. 
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2.2.  Previous Studies on Standards and Regulations 
 
There has been considerable research on the relationship between standards and 
regulations, including the environmental regulation and international trade. In such 
research, an important aspect is whether the focused standards and regulations are 
harmonized among trading partners. Theoretical predictions suggest that if the standard 
harmonizes exporter and importer, then the policy would promote international trade. 
Conversely, if the standard is country-specific, it would reduce international trade. Some 
of the researches attempting to confirm this theoretical prediction are Moenius (2004), 
which found that the country-specific standards inhibit international trade in the 
non-manufacturing sector but promote it in the manufacturing sector: Fontagne et al. 
(2005), which found mixed evidence across industries: Swann et al. (1996), which was 
focused on the impact of standards on trade performance in the UK. They found that, 
although internationally equivalent (harmonized) standards promote international trade, 
idiosyncratic UK standards promote exports but interrupt imports. 
These previous research intensely focused on the collective effect of standards 
and regulation. Although some related studies exist, there is no research that addresses 
the detailed effects of a specific policy, in particular, the effect of the RoHS directive on 
international trade in the EU. Thus, this study contributes a confirmation of the detailed 
effect of a specific policy. 
 
 
3. The Gravity Model and Zero Trade Flows 
 
In this analysis, I employ the gravity model suggested by Tinbergen (1969), which is an 
empirical specification used to explain trade flows and FDI flows. In the basic model, 
the dependent variable is the bilateral trade flow, and independent variables are the 
economic scales of each country and the distance between exporter and importer. The 
gravity model has the advantage that the estimation results tend to have a high 
goodness-of-fit. However, this model is criticized for its lack of theoretical background. 
Thus, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) suggested the modified gravity equation, 
obtained from the monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stigliz (1977). 
With respect to international trade flows, much recent research attempts to 
consider many trade observations that contain zero trade values. For example, Disdier, 
 Fontagne, and Mimouni (2008) estimated the gravity equation with log(1 + trade) as the 
dependent variable.2 Instead of adjusting the trade flow, Eaton and Tamura (2004) 
recommended adopting the Tobit model. Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2010, 2011) 
suggested Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator for estimating the gravity 
equation. This method is used to obtain consistent estimates in the log-linear form and 
can consider the zero values of a dependent variable to assume a Poisson distribution. 
In this study, as already noted in figures 1 and 2, I employ the sample selection 
model and the extended procedure suggested by HMR. 
 
 
3.1.  Sample Selection 
 
The sample selection model has two types of estimation methods: the maximum 
likelihood method and the OLS method with an inverse Mills ratio used by Heckman 
(1979). The gravity model with a two-step estimation procedure measures a different 
effect during each stage. The effect on persistence of trade is measured in the first stage 
estimation, and the effect on values of trade is measured in the second stage estimation. 
The former corresponds to an extensive margin of trade, and the latter an intensive 
margin. For example, Czubala, Shepherd, and Wilson (2009) use this procedure to 
measure the impact of harmonized standards on African exports. 
 
 
3.2. Correction of Sample Selection and Firm Heterogeneity 
 
The two-stage sample selection model can estimate the impact of every variable on the 
trade flow. However, HMR observes that firms vary in productivity and that if the firm 
heterogeneity correlates with the decision making of the firm’s export behavior, it is not 
sufficient to correct only the sample selection bias. Moreover, they suggest the 
appropriate estimation procedure for that case. I employ not only the sample selection 
model but also their procedure to estimate the gravity model with an environmental 
regulation as a trade barrier. 
The first stage estimation equation of the HMR procedure is same as the first 
one of sample selection. However, in the second stage estimation, the consistent 
estimator is obtained by adding firm heterogeneity correction terms and a sample 
                                                   
2 See also Kellenberg (2009). He regressed the Heckscher-Ohlin model with log(1 + trade). 
 selection correction term. The firm heterogeneity correction term is a monotonic 
function of the predicted value of first stage probit. HMR found no noticeable changes 
when expanding beyond a cubic polynomial. Therefore, I use the cubic polynomial form 
in the predicted value of first stage probit instead of the firm heterogeneity correction 
term. 
To estimate the effect of the environmental regulation, specifically the RoHS 
directive, on the presence of trade and trade value, I apply the standard Heckman’s 
correction and the HMR correction for sample selection and firm heterogeneity to 
estimate the gravity model. 
 
 
4. Estimation Procedures and Data 
 
As described above, I employ two estimation methods, Heckman’s sample selection 
model and HMR’s sample selection and firm heterogeneity correction model. Both 
methods require the same first stage probit selection equation: 
 
    𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = Pr(𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1|observed variables) 
      = Φ(𝛼0 + 𝛼𝐸𝑋 + 𝛼𝐼𝑀 + 𝛼𝐻𝑆 + 𝛼𝑄𝑇 + 𝐱𝑖𝑗𝑘
′ 𝛂 + 𝐱2𝑖𝑗𝑘
′ 𝛂𝟐)            (1) 
 
where 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the probability that country 𝑗 exports goods 𝑘 to country 𝑖, conditional 
on the observed variables, and where the indicator variable 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘 is equal to 1 when 
country 𝑗 exports goods 𝑘 to country 𝑖 and 0 otherwise. This equation includes the 
fixed effects of exporter, importer, goods, and quarterly time: 𝛼𝐸𝑋, 𝛼𝐼𝑀, 𝛼𝐻𝑆 and 𝛼𝑄𝑇 
respectively. The variables 𝐱 and 𝐱𝟐 are the vector of explanatory variables; note that 
𝐱𝟐 is only included in the first stage probit. The parameters 𝛂 and 𝛂𝟐 are vectors of 
coefficient of explanatory variables. The estimated results from equation (1) imply an 
extensive margin of each variable. 
The second stage regression equation using Heckman’s (1979) estimator, the 
Heckit estimator, is as follows: 
 
    𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽𝐼𝑀 + 𝛽𝐻𝑆 + 𝛽𝑄𝑇 + 𝐱𝑖𝑗𝑘
′ 𝛃 + 𝛽𝜆?̂? + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘                 (2) 
 
where 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the log of import value. The parameters 𝛽𝐸𝑋, 𝛽𝐼𝑀, 𝛽𝐻𝑆 and 𝛽𝑄𝑇 are 
the fixed effects of exporter, importer, goods, and quarterly time, respectively. The 
parameter 𝜆  is the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage probit, and 𝛽𝜆  is its 
 parameter. The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 is i.i.d. satisfying E(𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘|𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1) = 0. 
Alternatively, the HMR estimator is as follows: 
 
    𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽𝐼𝑀 + 𝛽𝐻𝑆 + 𝛽𝑄𝑇 + 𝐱𝑖𝑗𝑘
′ 𝛃 
        + 𝛿1𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ + 𝛿2(𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ )
2
+ 𝛿3(𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ )
3
+ 𝛽𝜂?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ + 𝑒𝑖𝑗              (3) 
 
where the variable ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ = 𝜙(?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ ) Φ(?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ )⁄  is the inverse Mills ratio calculated using 
?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ ≡ Φ−1(?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘) , and 𝛽𝜂 is the parameter of the inverse Mills ratio. 𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ , (𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ )
2
 
and (𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ )
3
 are the firm heterogeneity correction terms in cubic polynomial form in 
𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ ≡ ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ + ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ . The The error term 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 is i.i.d. satisfying E(𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘|𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1) = 0.
3 
The estimated results of equations (2) and (3) show an intensive margin. 
Because the RoHS directive covers a subset of goods traded in the EU market, 
this study considers only the imports of EU countries and the manufacturing industries 
HS 2-digit commodities, 84-85 (machinery and electrical), 86-89(transportation) and 
90-92(miscellaneous related to machinery excluding arms). Furthermore, the estimation 
periods from the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2010 are used to compare 
the before and after of this policy. Because of the data availability, I use 19 countries as 
importers and 54 countries as the exporters, including all countries of the EU.4 
The dataset used in this study includes bilateral trade values, the basic variables 
of the gravity equation, other control variables, and information about the RoHS 
directive. The bilateral trade value is obtained from Eurostat. Real GDP is obtained 
from International Financial Statistics. The distance between exporter and importer, 
common language, common border, colonial relationship and landlocked status are 
obtained from CEPII. For estimation, the bilateral trade value, GDP, and distance data 
are used in logarithmic form. The common language dummy variable is equal to 1 if 
both the exporter and importer countries use a common language and 0 otherwise. The 
common border dummy variable is equal to 1 if the exporter and importer have a 
common border and 0 otherwise. The colonial relationship dummy variable is equal to 1 
if the exporter and importer have a previous colonial relationship and 0 otherwise. The 
landlocked dummy variable is equal to 1 if both the exporter and importer lack a 
coastline or direct sea access and 0 otherwise. 
                                                   
3 For more details on how this estimation equation was obtained, see Appendix II. 
4 For more details concerning the considered countries, see Appendix I. 
 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Both methods are identified by the first stage probit selection equation (1), 
where it is learnt that. These variables affect fixed trade costs but do not affect variable 
trade costs. I use a country-level data on the regulation costs of firm entry, collected by 
Djankov et al. (2002) according to the procedure in HMR. Specifically, I use the 
number of days, the number of legal procedures, and the relative cost of an entrepreneur 
to begin operation as a percentage of GDP per capital. In a manner similar to that of 
HMR, I use these data to construct two indicator variables for a high fixed cost, 
consisting of country pairs in which both the importing and exporting countries have 
entry regulation measures above the cross-country median. One of the regulation cost 
variables is constructed from the sum of the number of days and procedures, and the 
other variable is constructed from sum of the relative costs. 
The RoHS directive is represented as an indicator variable. According to the 
policy schedule, the RoHS dummy variable is equal to 1 when it correspond to HS84, 
85, 90, 91, or 92, which include the target goods of the RoHS directive in the third 
quarter of 2006 and after, and 0 otherwise.5 In addition, I construct an indicator variable 
                                                   
5 The goods represented by each code are as follows: 
HS84: Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances, and computers 
HS85: Electrical machinery, equipment and parts, telecommunications equipment, sound recorders, 
and television recorders 
HS90: Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, cheking, precision and medical or surgical 
Variable Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
trade million in Euro 406296 32.548 170.837 0.000 5720.330
ln(trade) 276092 -0.479 3.849 -13.8155 8.652
Tijk 406296 0.680 0.467 0 1
GDPexp million in Euro 361791 416262.200 1592002.000 360.009 13096258.514
ln(GDPexp) 361791 10.893 1.808 5.886 16.388
GDPimp million in Euro 381024 148969.000 171530.200 4161.994 607043.900
ln(GDPimp) 381024 11.235 1.202 8.334 13.316
distance km 406296 5827.042 4563.115 141.446 19537.120
ln(distance) 406296 8.210 1.085 4.952 9.880
EU dummy 406296 0.256 0.436 0 1
common language 406296 0.055 0.227 0 1
common border 406296 0.049 0.215 0 1
colonial relationship 406296 0.076 0.265 0 1
landlock 406296 0.012 0.108 0 1
cost 406296 0.146 0.353 0 1
proc&days 406296 0.171 0.376 0 1
RoHS dummy 406296 0.227 0.419 0 1
RoHS transition period 406296 0.177 0.381 0 1
 to represent the transition period between the establishment and the enforcement of the 
regulation to examine the firm behavior in these periods. The RoHS transition period 
dummy variable is equal to 1 when the goods are targets of the RoHS directive from the 
first quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2006 and 0 otherwise. 
Additionally, I use an EU dummy variable that is equal to 1 if both the exporter 
and importer countries are members of the EU and 0 otherwise. The descriptive 
statistics used in this study are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
5.1. Baseline Results 
 
Table 2 shows the baseline estimated results. As a benchmark, it is shown separately the 
estimation results of equation (1) without entering for the identification variables and 
the basic gravity model using OLS. In the first stage probit, all variables are significant 
at a 1% level. As we can imagine, the distance between exporter and importer has a 
negative effect on the probability of persistence of trade, whereas a common language, 
common border, colonial relationship, and whether the country is landlocked have 
positive effects. If both countries become members of the EU, the bilateral trade 
between these countries disappears. The RoHS dummy variable has a negative effect, 
implying that the probability of persistence of trade of machinery, electrical and 
electronic equipment decline in response to the RoHS directive. Estimation of the 
traditional gravity equation using OLS uses data on country pairs that trade in at least 
one direction for each good. Note that the OLS estimator does not contain zero trade 
values and is econometrically problematic. The GDPs of the exporter and importer have 
a positive effect and are statistically significant. Distance, common language, common 
border, colonial relationship, and landlocked status have the same effect in direction as 
in the first stage probit. Unlike the results of the first stage, the coefficient of joining the 
EU is positive and statistically significant. In addition, the RoHS dummy variable is 
significantly negative in the first stage. These results of the benchmark estimation show 
that the RoHS directive decreases the fraction of existing the trade and trade values of 
the intended goods. 
   Next, the Heckit estimator of the second stage estimation, equation (2), is shown 
                                                                                                                                                     
instruments and accessories 
HS91: Clocks, watches, and parts 
HS92: Musical instruments, parts, and accessories 
 Table 2. Baseline results 
 
Note: The marginal effect of sample means and pseudo 𝑅2 reported for probit and first stage. The robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Heckit HMR
RoHS -0.00632*** -0.00634*** -0.0684*** -0.0836*** -0.0912***
(0.00216) (0.00216) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0210)
GDPexp -0.00746*** -0.00740*** 0.0568* 0.0493* 0.0400
(0.00280) (0.00280) (0.0297) (0.0292) (0.0314)
GDPimp -0.0196*** -0.0196*** 0.664*** 0.659*** 0.629***
(0.00569) (0.00569) (0.0505) (0.0503) (0.0593)
distance -0.0852*** -0.0851*** -0.855*** -0.907*** -0.986***
(0.00227) (0.00226) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.143)
EU dummy -0.0119*** -0.0120*** 0.373*** 0.337*** 0.353***
(0.00271) (0.00271) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0267)
common language 0.0284*** 0.0292*** 0.358*** 0.362*** 0.402***
(0.00271) (0.00271) (0.0223) (0.0225) (0.0602)
common border 0.0650*** 0.0651*** 0.244*** 0.224*** 0.523***
(0.00218) (0.00217) (0.0203) (0.0206) (0.173)
colonial relationship 0.0388*** 0.0386*** 0.510*** 0.581*** 0.609***
(0.00202) (0.00203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0825)
landlock 0.0402*** 0.0396*** 0.194*** 0.277*** 0.174*
(0.00483) (0.00490) (0.0428) (0.0422) (0.0952)
cost -0.00866***
(0.00245)
proc&days 0.00198
(0.00221)
inverse mills ratio 0.966***
(0.0223)
3.048***
(0.250)
2.932***
(0.259)
-0.641***
(0.0107)
0.0371***
(0.000795)
constant 0.00166 0.537 4.711
(0.836) (0.829) (3.799)
Obs. 339,039 339,039 239,322 239,322 239,322
R-squared 0.581 0.581 0.735 0.738 0.750
1st stage
2nd stage
OLSProbit
?̂? ∗
?̂?∗
?̂? ∗ 2
?̂? ∗ 3
 in Table 2. For the two-step sample selection procedure, two fixed cost variables are 
added in the first stage probit. Only relative cost has a significant effect at 1%, implying 
that a fixed entry cost decreases the probability of persistence of trade. Based on these 
first stage results, the second stage result using the Heckit estimator is obtained with the 
inverse Mills ratio. The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant at 
a 1% level, implying that the Heckit estimator is better than the OLS because a 
correlation exists between the error terms in the first and second stage. The RoHS 
dummy variable continues to have a significantly negative effect, but the magnitude of 
the estimated parameter is approximately 1.22 times that of the OLS. 
Alternatively, the HMR estimator is obtained using the same first stage 
estimated results. The correction term for the sample selection, ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ , and firm 
heterogeneity correction terms ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ , (?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ )
2
 and (?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ )
3
 are statistically significant at 
a 1% level, implying that both firm heterogeneity and sample selection require 
correction. The coefficient of the RoHS dummy variable is -0.0912, and statistically 
significant. This value is larger than the results using the OLS and Heckit estimator and 
is approximately 1.33 times that of the OLS. 
These results show that the RoHS directive decreases the fraction of existing 
trade and the trade values of intended goods. Additionally, in an appropriate approach, 
the magnitude of the extensive margin caused by the RoHS directive is 0.6%, and that 
of the intensive margin is 0.0912%. 
 
 
5.2. Intraregional trade in the EU versus import from outside the EU 
 
Next, to consider the effect of whether the same regulation exists for both the exporter 
and importer, I split the sample used in the estimation. One subsample includes only EU 
countries as exporter (i.e., intraregional trade in the EU), and the other subsample 
includes only imports from outside the EU. 
In EU intraregional trade, the effect of the RoHS dummy variable in the first 
stage probit is significantly negative, as it is in the baseline results. However, the 
coefficients of RoHS using the Heckit estimator and the HMR estimator are 
significantly positive at a 1% level. According to the significance of each correction 
term, the result of the HMR estimator, 0.143, is more appropriate and larger than that of 
the Heckit estimator (approximately 1.82 times). However, even after using both 
methods for estimating the coefficients of RoHS dummy variable, an importer from 
 Table 3. Estimated results using subsample 
 
Note: The marginal effect of sample means and pseudo 𝑅2 reported for the first stage. The robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Heckit HMR Heckit HMR
RoHS -0.000219** 0.0785*** 0.143*** -0.0107** -0.216*** -0.338***
(9.85e-05) (0.0223) (0.0221) (0.00510) (0.0271) (0.0325)
GDPexp -0.000269 0.111 0.165** -0.0122* -0.131*** -0.260***
(0.000218) (0.0690) (0.0681) (0.00638) (0.0347) (0.0402)
GDPimp -0.000231 0.638*** 0.682*** -0.0505*** 0.553*** -0.00436
(0.000217) (0.0634) (0.0623) (0.0140) (0.0715) (0.112)
distance -0.00214*** -1.112*** -0.578*** -0.185*** -1.307*** -3.279***
(0.000321) (0.0156) (0.0266) (0.00723) (0.0353) (0.323)
EU dummy -0.000211*** 0.510*** 0.570***
(6.87e-05) (0.0210) (0.0207)
common language -0.000823* 0.116*** 0.232*** 0.0786*** 0.292*** 1.246***
(0.000421) (0.0290) (0.0288) (0.00682) (0.0319) (0.148)
common border 0.000829*** 0.0573*** -0.219*** 0.190*** 0.618*** 4.152***
(0.000137) (0.0214) (0.0234) (0.0103) (0.0596) (0.506)
colonial relationship 0.000730*** 0.370*** 0.0414 0.0838*** 0.590*** 1.570***
(0.000119) (0.0252) (0.0285) (0.00591) (0.0306) (0.162)
landlock 2.14e-05 -0.0900* -0.118** 0.111*** 0.334*** 1.665***
(0.000198) (0.0469) (0.0460) (0.0148) (0.0749) (0.242)
cost -0.000176 -0.00653
(0.000117) (0.00566)
proc&days 0.000496*** -0.0127**
(9.03e-05) (0.00556)
inverse mills ratio -0.491*** 1.467***
(0.0388) (0.0275)
0.647*** 6.742***
(0.0670) (0.537)
2.248*** 0.609
(0.0766) (0.540)
-0.254*** -0.925***
(0.0134) (0.0184)
0.0114*** 0.0598***
(0.000887) (0.00147)
constant -0.523 -9.336*** -8.695*** 31.50***
(1.115) (1.129) (0.743) (4.896)
Obs. 118,728 105,040 105,040 220,311 134,282 134,282
R-squared 0.541 0.797 0.805 0.564 0.694 0.707
Import from outside of EU
2nd stage
1st stage 1st stage
Intraregional trade in EU
2nd stage
?̂? ∗
?̂?∗
?̂? ∗ 2
?̂? ∗ 3
 outside the EU faces a significantly negative effect at a 1% level, as in the baseline 
results. Although one of the correction terms, ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ , is not significant, the HMR 
estimator is more appropriate than the Heckit estimator; the estimate value is -0.338. 
These results imply that the intensive effects of the RoHS directive are different 
between intraregional trade in the EU and for imports from outside the EU. In the 
intraregional, all EU countries conform to the same RoHS directive, and exporting firms 
in EU countries must pay the additional cost induced by the RoHS directive, but at the 
same time it is possible to avoid the additional cost of compliance for an importer 
country. Conversely, exporting firms outside the EU must pay the additional cost for 
compliance in the EU. Thus, this increased cost of production caused by the RoHS 
directive can potentially cause firms to exit the exporting market regardless of 
harmonization. However, an exporter regulated by harmonized standards has an 
advantage over an exporter regulated by non-harmonized standards and can increase the 
export value. 
 
 
5.3.  Effect during Transitional Period 
 
I also consider the transition periods between the establishment of the restrictive policy 
and its enforcement. In these periods, some firms attempt to adapt their products to the 
forward new regulations, in spite of not being regulated at that time. These firms may 
incur into additional costs associated with both identifying alternative inputs as 
substitutes for restricted materials and purchasing such inputs, which are expected to be 
more expensive than restricted materials. Thus, the probability and value of trade can 
potentially decrease due to the restrictive policy. 
In Table 3, the estimation with the RoHS transition period dummy variable is 
repeated using the full sample with the result that the RoHS directive has a negative and 
significant effect on the extensive and intensive margins, with all correction terms are 
significant at a 1% level. The results using HMR estimator remain more appropriate 
than those of the Heckit estimator. The transition period dummy variable considered in 
this section also has a significantly negative effect on the probability of the persistence 
of trade and trade values. Using the same subsample as in section 5.2, the RoHS dummy 
variable differs little from the results in section 5.2 in sign and magnitude. However, in 
EU intraregional trade, the transition period dummy variable has a significantly negative 
effect with the Heckit estimator but an insignificantly negative effect with the HMR 
estimator. Although we cannot reject the possibility of no effect, the RoHS directive 
 Table 3. The effect during the transition period 
 
Note: The marginal effect of sample means and pseudo 𝑅2 reported for the first stage. The robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
Heckit HMR Heckit HMR Heckit HMR
RoHS -0.0125*** -0.149*** -0.168*** -0.000371*** 0.0370 0.135*** -0.0241*** -0.314*** -0.588***
(0.00276) (0.0229) (0.0305) (0.000136) (0.0277) (0.0275) (0.00642) (0.0340) (0.0534)
trans RoHS -0.0106*** -0.116*** -0.135*** -0.000246* -0.0747*** -0.0149 -0.0234*** -0.170*** -0.434***
(0.00284) (0.0242) (0.0293) (0.000131) (0.0289) (0.0286) (0.00662) (0.0359) (0.0533)
inverse mills ratio 1.060*** -0.418*** 1.523***
(0.0258) (0.0449) (0.0318)
3.047*** 0.649*** 6.758***
(0.250) (0.0670) (0.538)
2.931*** 2.251*** 0.592
(0.260) (0.0766) (0.541)
-0.641*** -0.255*** -0.925***
(0.0107) (0.0134) (0.0184)
0.0371*** 0.0114*** 0.0599***
(0.000795) (0.000887) (0.00147)
Obs. 339,039 239,322 239,322 118,728 105,040 105,040 220,311 134,282 134,282
R-squared 0.581 0.738 0.750 0.541 0.797 0.805 0.564 0.694 0.707
Import from outside of EU
1st stage
2nd stage
1st stage
Full sample Intraregional trade in EU
2nd stage
1st stage
2nd stage
?̂? ∗
?̂?∗
?̂? ∗ 2
?̂? ∗ 3
 would likely decrease the trade value in the transition period. 
These results imply that the exporting firms paid an additional cost for 
compliance before the RoHS directive was first enforced. After this, the exporter 
regulated harmonized standards had the potential to increase trade values. However, it is 
observed that the RoHS directive has the potential of decreasing trade value because of 
two important points. First, exporters may seek alternative inputs; and second, they may 
purchase more expensive materials during the transition period, prior to the regulation 
enforcement. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This study estimates the effect of the RoHS directive that restricts the sale of machinery, 
electrical and electronic equipment that contain hazardous substances. In empirical 
research, the gravity model is widely used to analyze international trade flows. In this 
study, it is employed the sample selection model and the extended procedure suggested 
by HMR in order to consider the effect on persistence of trade and values of trade. 
Estimated results show that the RoHS directive decreases the fraction of existing trade 
and trade values of intended goods in the EU. However, to distinguish between 
intraregional trade in the EU and imports from outside the EU, I find that the RoHS 
directive as a harmonized standard promotes intraregional trade. Additionally, this 
policy has the potential to decrease trade value during the transition period of regulation. 
The RoHS directive is inadvertently a protective policy, that is, a trade barrier to 
exporting to the EU market from outside the EU. In EU countries, the probability of 
existing trade decreases but trade value increases because of the harmonized standard. 
This effect represents the potential of specialized and divisional production. 
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 Appendix I 
 
List of countries is shown in Table A1. 
 
Table A1. Countries in the dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Importer
Argentina Ireland Austria
Australia Israel Belgium
Austria Italy Bulgaria
Belgium Jamaica Czech Republic
Bolivia Japan Denmark
Brazil Jordan Finland
Bulgaria Korea, Rep. France
Cambodia Malaysia Germany
Canada Mexico Greece
Chile Morocco Hungary
China Netherlands Ireland
Colombia New Zealand Italy
Costa Rica Norway Netherlands
Czech Republic Peru Poland
Denmark Philippines Potrugal
Ecuador Poland Romania
Egypt Potrugal Spain
El Salvador Romania Sweden
Finland Singapore United Kingdom
France Spain
Germany Sweden
Greece Switzerland
Guatemala Thailand
Hong Kong SAR, China Tunisia
Hungary Turkey
India United Kingdom
Indonesia United States
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Exporter
 Appendix II 
 
I explain the theoretical model of Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) to obtain the 
estimation equation. 
Consider that country 𝑗’s consumer has constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
preference for differentiated varieties of product. Under budget constraint, standard 
demand function is obtained; depend on a given price index and income. Firm in 
country 𝑗 produces one unit of output with a cost-minimizing combination of inputs 
that cost 𝑐𝑗𝑎, where 𝑐𝑗 reflect differences across countries in factor prices and this is 
country specific, whereas 𝑎 is firm specific amount of inputs, reflecting productivity 
differences across firms in the same country. The inverse of 𝑎 represents the firm’s 
productivity level. HMR assume that a cumulative distribution function 𝐺(𝑎) with 
support [𝑎𝐿 , 𝑎𝐻] describes the distribution of a across firms, where 𝑎𝐻 > 𝑎𝐿 > 0, 
based on Melitz (2003).6 This distribution function is the same across all countries. 
Country 𝑗’s producer have two additional cost to seek to sell its product in country 𝑖: a 
fixed cost of entering the market in country 𝑖, which equals to 𝑐𝑗𝑓𝑖𝑗, and a transport 
cost. As is customary, they adopt the “iceberg” specification that 𝜏𝑖𝑗 units of a product 
have to be shipped for one unit to arrive. A cost of entry is needed only if firm try to go 
into foreign market, i.e. 𝑓𝑗𝑗 = 0 for all 𝑗. And, assume that there is no transport cost in 
home country, i.e. 𝜏𝑗𝑗 = 1 for all 𝑗.  
There is monopolistic competition in final products. Every producer set price of 
product with profit maximization. Using demand function and profit maximizing price, 
the operating profit of firm in country 𝑗 selling to country 𝑖 is depend on the firm’s 
productivity level as following: 
 
    𝜋𝑖𝑗(𝑎) = (1 − 𝛼) (
𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑗𝑎
𝛼𝑃𝑖
)
1−𝜀
𝑌𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗𝑓𝑖𝑗             (A. 1) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖  is price index, 𝑌𝑖  is the income of country 𝑖 . 𝛼  is the parameter that 
determine the elasticity of substitution across product, which is 𝜀 = 1 (1 − 𝛼)⁄ . The 
operating profits are positive for sales in the domestic market because 𝑓𝑗𝑗 = 0 . 
Therefore all producer, 𝑁𝑗, sell in country 𝑗. On the other hand, sales in foreign country 
are profitable only if 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎𝑖𝑗, where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is defined by 𝜋𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑖𝑗) = 0, or: 
 
                                                   
6 HMR assume that firm’s productivity 1 𝑎⁄  is Patero distributed, truncated to the support [𝑎𝐿, 𝑎𝐻]. 
Then, they assume 𝐺(𝑎) = (𝑎𝑘 − 𝑎𝐿
𝑘) (𝑎𝐻
𝑘 − 𝑎𝐿
𝑘)⁄ , 𝑘 > (𝜀 − 1), and so suggest nonlinear estimates but I 
do not adopt this. 
     (1 − 𝛼) (
𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑃𝑖
)
1−𝜀
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑐𝑗𝑓𝑖𝑗                 (A. 2) 
 
 
Using the demand function and pricing equation, the value of country 𝑖’s imports from 
𝑗 is obtained as following: 
 
    𝑀𝑖𝑗 = (
𝑐𝑗𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑃𝑖
)
1−𝜀
𝑌𝑖𝑁𝑗𝑉𝑖𝑗                   (A. 3) 
 
where 
 
    𝑉𝑖𝑗 = {
∫ 𝑎1−𝜀𝑑𝐺(𝑎)
𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑎𝐿
  for 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑎𝐿
 0      otherwise
             (A. 4) 
 
This bilateral trade value is equals zero when 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑎𝐿, because 𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 0. If 𝑎𝑖𝑗 > 𝑎𝐿, 
𝑉𝑖𝑗 is increasing in 𝑎𝑖𝑗. Therefore, 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is depend on the cutoff value of 𝑎𝑖𝑗, which is 
implicitly defined by zero profit condition (A.2). Let define a related latent variables 
𝑍𝑖𝑗 as follow: 
 
    𝑍𝑖𝑗 ≡
(1 − 𝛼) (𝑃𝑖
𝛼
𝑐𝑗𝜏𝑖𝑗
)
𝜀−1
𝑌𝑖𝑎𝐿
1−𝜀
𝑐𝑗𝑓𝑖𝑗
                  (A. 5) 
 
This is the ratio of variable export profits for the most productive firm to the fixed 
export costs for exports from 𝑗 to 𝑖. If 𝑍𝑖𝑗 becomes equal to 1, there is no exporting 
firm by zero profit condition (A.2). If 𝑍𝑖𝑗 becomes greater than 1, the gap between 𝑎𝐿 
and 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is increasing in 𝑍𝑖𝑗. In fact, more firms export to foreign market. Positive 
exports are observed if and only if 𝑍𝑖𝑗 > 1. In this case, 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is monotonic function of 
𝑍𝑖𝑗. Moreover, the value of 𝑍𝑖𝑗 affects the export value 𝑀𝑖𝑗. 
For obtaining parameterized estimation equation, I specify some variables. 𝜏𝑖𝑗 
captures variable trade costs that affect the volume of firm-level exports. Assume that 
these costs are stochastic due to i.i.d. unmeasured trade friction 𝑢𝑖𝑗 , which are 
country-pair specific. In particular, let 𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝜀−1 ≡ 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝛾 𝑒−𝑢𝑖𝑗 , where 𝐷𝑖𝑗  represents the 
distance between 𝑖  and 𝑗 , and 𝑢𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) . In addition, let 𝑓𝑖𝑗 ≡ exp(𝜙𝐸𝑋,𝑗 +
 𝜙𝐼𝑀,𝑖 + 𝜅𝜙𝑖𝑗 − 𝜈𝑖𝑗), where 𝜈𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜈
2). The export value from 𝑗 to 𝑖 and latent 
variable can be expressed in log-linear form as follows: 
 
    𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝜆𝑗 + 𝜒𝑖 − 𝛾𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗                                    (A. 6) 
 
where 𝜆𝑗 = −(𝜀 − 1) ln 𝑐𝑗 + 𝑛𝑗  is a fixed effect of the exporting country and 
𝜒𝑖 = (𝜀 − 1)𝑝𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 is a fixed effect of the importing country, and: 
 
    𝑧𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾0 + 𝜁𝑗 + 𝜉𝑖 − 𝛾𝑑𝑖𝑗 − 𝜅𝜙𝑖𝑗 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗                                              (A. 7) 
 
where 𝜁𝑗 = −𝜀 ln 𝑐𝑗 − 𝜙𝐸𝑋,𝑗  is a fixed effect of the exporting country and 𝜉𝑖 =
(𝜀 − 1)𝑝𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 − 𝜙𝐼𝑀,𝑖 is a fixed effect of the importing country. 
 
Now, since 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is function of 𝑍𝑖𝑗 , assume 𝑣𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝜐(𝑧𝑖𝑗) that is arbitrary increasing 
function of 𝑧𝑖𝑗. Although 𝑧𝑖𝑗 is unobserved, we can observe the presence of trade 
flows. Therefore 𝑧𝑖𝑗 > 0 when 𝑗 exports to 𝑖, and 𝑧𝑖𝑗 = 0 when does it not. Define 
the indicator variable 𝑇𝑖𝑗 to equal when country 𝑗 exports to 𝑖, and 0 otherwise. Let 
𝜌𝑖𝑗 be the probability that 𝑗 exports to 𝑖, conditional on the observed variables. I 
divide (A.7) by the standard deviation 𝜎𝜂 , 𝜎𝜂
2 ≡ 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝜈
2 , and specify the Probit 
equation to estimate the equation (A.7) as following:7 
 
    𝜌𝑖𝑗 = Pr(𝑇𝑖𝑗 = 1|observed variables) 
      = Φ(𝛾0
∗ + 𝜁𝑗
∗ + 𝜉𝑖
∗ − 𝛾∗𝑑𝑖𝑗 − 𝜅
∗𝜙𝑖𝑗)                   (A. 8) 
 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, 
and every stared parameter represents the original coefficient divided by 𝜎𝜂. Using 
predicted probability of exports from 𝑗 to 𝑖, ?̂?𝑖𝑗, let ?̂?𝑖𝑗
∗ = Φ−1(?̂?𝑖𝑗) be the predicted 
value of the latent variable 𝑧𝑖𝑗
∗ ≡ 𝑧𝑖𝑗 𝜎𝜂⁄ . 
Consistent estimation of (A.7) requires controls for both the endogenous number 
of exporters, 𝑣𝑖𝑗, as well as the sample selection. Using ?̂?𝑖𝑗
∗ , the inverse Mills ratio 
?̂?𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝜙(?̂?𝑖𝑗
∗ ) Φ(?̂?𝑖𝑗
∗ )⁄  is obtained to correct the sample selection bias. For firm 
heterogeneity, assume that 𝜐(𝑧𝑖𝑗) is approximately a polynomial in 𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗
∗ = ?̂?𝑖𝑗
∗ + ?̂?𝑖𝑗
∗ . 
HMR found no noticeable changes from expanding 𝜐(𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗
∗ ) beyond a cubic polynomial. 
Therefore, I use cubic polynomial form in 𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗
∗  in place of 𝑣𝑖𝑗. Using these correction 
terms, estimation equation for value of imports is as follow: 
                                                   
7 HMR employs dividing the equation (A.7) to avoid imposing 𝜎𝜂
2 ≡ 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝜈
2 = 1. 
  
    𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝜆𝑗 + 𝜒𝑖 − 𝛾𝑑𝑖𝑗 
        + 𝛽𝜂?̂?𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝛿1𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗
∗ + 𝛿2(𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗
∗ )
2
+ 𝛿3(𝑧̅̂𝑖𝑗
∗ )
3
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑗             (A. 9) 
 
where 𝛽𝜂 ≡ corr(𝑢𝑖𝑗 , 𝜂𝑖𝑗)(𝜎𝑢 𝜎𝜂⁄ ) is parameter of inverse Mills ratio, 𝛿 is parameter 
of the term to correct the firm heterogeneity and 𝑒𝑖𝑗 is an i.i.d. error term. I expand the 
dimension of these estimation equations by the addition of the variety of goods, index 𝑘, 
but this keeps unchanged the structure of the model in essentials. 
 
